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The Reagan Legacy: Undoing
Class, Race and Gender Accords.
MIMi A[IRAMOVITZ
-limier College
I' iiipact of Rcagimuosics on woiien, torkers, an U pr'psrl, if color
is exlPloired it looking tit sirnicurat fJcn.', in the politicil econitiiy that
oiicOIti ,' 1ijSint.K-s asid goilersssest (iit a fitic Ie sitl drf alit! anolh'r
listi' to tiudcrtisw the , r'fivsre stiate. Vih expansion o ' fit' r i'lefit' str c
fivins 1.935 to the sid-'1970s iesh ed well willh the needs v./ ptofittfsle Il-
etiwliosi, political legitilimcy ail jntrio-hal control. With the ero'riiir
crisis of the 1970s, fire w'(ur' rstalrh' u'cam' too co1lit th't dive li itrl
lcsflsslhifsoi and too stlpo'live ofa'stspotr 'rc'd popltrr sno''nTlrlt:Is e11d
1iart io go. Wonren, perosft; of colo, tut lihe poor raked righ attut.u"
the victiss of the tiw hris fruity p/1tt.
The 1935 Social Security Act, widely viewed as niarkiin the
birth of the modern welfare staill in (he United Slates, was t'n-
acted duhring a crisis in which te political and economic ir-
rangements supportive of capital accurmulation, socini stability,
and patriarchal controls from the 1890s to the 193(0s collapsed
(Bowles, 1982; Bowles & Gintis 1982; Bowles Gordon, & Weis-
skopf, 1983, 1986; Kotz, 1987, 1990). Signaled by Ihie 1929 stock
market crash, the crisis revealtd what many already knew: thll
the drive for high profits and low wages that characterizes cap-
italist production, could not assure the levels of wages and e(m-
ployment needed to suppori the average family unless IhIt' siat
intervened. The state had to step in and absorb man'oftJ the
costs of family formation and naintenance since pr-ofitable pro-
duction depended heavily onl the family system (and wonen's
unpaid labor within it) to produce, nurture, and socialize the
current and future labor for'ce; to provide care fr Ih lu,;c to
young, old, sick to car'e for- themselves; and to assure Ihat in-
dividuals affiliate with and inlegrate into society (Gough 1980;
Dickinson & Russell, 1986; Sokoloff, 1981).
9) I
Jiuirnal (f Sociolo,iy 61 .,;Icial W\'elfare
The enactment of the Social Security Act ('r'ectively legal-
ized federal responsibility for social welfare. li flu, short run,
this major reslructiuring of [le svslt'iii of social welfare provi-
sion cushioned the immediate blows of Lhe I)epression. It p1t
cash into emnllty hands and increased purchasing power, which
assisted people in need while ,limulating the depressed econ-
OIT1y. In tht long run, bringing Ilie federal gove'rll men I into so-
cial welfare acknowledged that Ihe slate had to socialize 11w
costs of family lift' on a perman ,il basis. Instead of relying on
families, chari*ties, religious institutions and local governments
to mediate between economic profits and econornic security, the
federal government had to provide minimal sipporlt (Bowles,
1982; Bowles and Gintis, 1982; liowles, Gordon & Wei-skopf,
1983, 1986; Kolz, 1987, 1991).
The Social Security Act alsii lit-Ilp to restore (lit' political legil-
imacy of the stat. The thirties witnessed wid'spreI.ad agitation
by trade union and numerous other ipopular noivemnlents sg,,ek-
ing redress from tlie collapse amid underlyin, inItc'tlu iies of tlie
niarket. In I ie short run, the Ntw Oeal prograilis helped to
rest ore political and economic etl 1 llibrium by providing some
economic relief to thousands of jitople, legaliZing ulnions and
collective bargaiing, and bringing; the lea derg I popular move-
eients into the New Deal Admriinislration. In Ihe long run, Ihe
welfare state stabilized the ne'v economic ordter, restored the
political legitimacy of the state, and muted ithe class conflicts
, enerated by organized labor and other dislocated and disco-
franclised groups.
The rest r,'u ring of social .Vel frilC focusI .I li ea I ily on restor-
ing business activity and containing class conflicl. Much less
attention was pid to the demands of the tarly tivil rights
and women's movements. The NAACP, the Urban League and
women's rights movement had been active since lhth early part
.of the century but still lacked the voting power and politicat
clout to secure its agenda (Piven & Cloward, 1971; Skocpol,
1988). Althoutgh Roosevelt sup ort ed New )eal programs t ha i
benefited African Americans and white women, his adminis-
tration did not challenge the discrimination and the disenfran-
chisement of black Americans nor Ihe lack of equal opportunitly
for women. Both I he civil rights and women's novement faulted
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the New Deal for excluding their mim rs. Blacks in addition
criticized Roosevelt for not introducing antilynching laws or
passing civil rights lgislation during his four presidential lerlns
(Letichlenburg, 1963; Silkoff, 1981), The women's movenmenl cri-
tiqued the New Deal p ograms for placing then in sex stero-
typed jobs, offering then benefits as dependent sp(ses, and
refusing to undo Iavs barring employment by married woien
(Abriamovitz, 1988; Scharf, 1983, Ware, 1981).
The Post War Expansion (if ithe Welfare Stale
The welfare state expanded rapidly after World War 11. I)ktr-
ing this period Congress liberalized the Social Security Acl and
created new social service programs, Fuled by prosperily and
political struggles, the Cxpansion conlinted into the sixties with
the War on Poverty, lh' Great sociely, (Ind 'new laws Lo pr,,tect
civil rights, women's rights, the workplace, and the environ-
ment. The postwar ins( it li Iionalizat ioll of (lhe welfare, slat'i im-
proved the standard of living and delnncrilic rights (if wolmen,
labor, and people of color. It also meshe-d well with bisiness
profits, political stability, and patrimare-hal controls. Rlect~iing
the acceptance of goverillent reglii m (if the ec-riiln y alld
concessions to popular movements, the, expansion of lle wel-
fare slate was und(rpimd by CogitLion economic Ilhwory .and
informal accords negol iated wi di the lrade union, civil rights,
and womIleln's movellie'ls.
Keynesian Econmlics
Keynesian economics actively sanctioned a more interven-
tionist state. It called for governmnlen[ SlA ling and rel, ations
to assure that the economy recovered from its periodic crist' of
low p ixiduction and high unemployment. The theory lromii.ed
that if government lax and spending policies increase-d aggre-
gate demand, toleraled a moderate del'icil when necessary, and
controlled inflation, hightr profits for business and a btter stan-
dard of living for workers would result. The emphilsis on in-
creasing demand and therefore consum;ption, reversed earlier
economic practices which extracted profits by lowering ratlher
than raising the stlandard of living. By arguing that Ilie careful
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use of fiscal and monetary policy would benefil Ihe rich, the
middle class, and the poor, Keynesian economics drew support
for active government involvement. It did not, however, predict
that the informal accords negotiated with the trade: union, civil
rights, and women's movements would later turn the expanded
welfare state into an arena of i)olitical struggle.
The development of capitalism itself eroded the institutional
arrangements ihai previously shLided the economic activity of
business and the state from polilical influence (Piven & Clow-
ard, 1982). While promoting a more interventionist state, Key-
nesian economics could not eliminate the drive for high profits
and low wages nor could it promote greater equality. The re-
sulting inequities led the trade union, civil rights, and women's
novements to gain strength and to intensify their struggles.
The labor, race, and gender accords granted important disiri-
butional and political gains to each group while ensuring the
continu'ed dominance of business and the state. The accords
functioned until the mid-1970s when profound problems in do-
mestic and inter'national economies forced a new restructuring
of the social order and made the postwar accords susceptible
to attack.
Labor-Managenient Accord
The postwar period witnessed a reorganization of labor-
management, which until this time had been highly contentious
and disruptive. According to Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf
(1983, 1986) labor and manageient negotiated a new but infor-
mal pact which took hold after World War 11. Grounded in part
in New Deal legislation, the pact stabilized labor-management
relations, increased the bargaining power of unions and ex-
panded the welfare state. The 1935 Social Security Act,
especially Unemployment Insurance, provided workers with
an economic backup which strengthened their ability to resist
unfair wages and working conditions. The 11)35 Wagner Act
legalized collective bargaining which further sI regthened la-
bor's hand and established the National Labor Relations Board
to mediate labor-management conflicts. Tile 19,16 Employment
Act brought tile federal government into the picture to control
prices, unemployment, and inflation. Tle new laws gave man-
agement control over the workplace with fewer strikes, longer
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,union contracts and new shop floor rules. In exchang. for its
cooperation, labor won a share in capitalist prosperity thrIOgh
-higher wages, better working conditions, greater job security
:,and f'ewe'r anti-union campaigns. Tlhe government agreed to
regulate economic conditions and mediate the disputes.
* The accords smoothed the way for postwar business profits,
integrated labor into the political mainstream, and made labor
relations more predictable. Paradoxically, however, the accords
also empowered labor. [he expansion of the welfare siale, thegrowth of the trade union movement, and the enforcement of
newly won gains by Ihe state improved labor's standard of liv-
ing and gave unions a grealer say on tilt' shop floor. The 1947
Taft-l-lartley Act and the 1950 Macarran Act and the rise of
McCarthyism narrowed labor's advances. But at the time of the
merger of tie American Federation of Labor and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations in 1955, a record 35,'",. of the labor force
was unionized. A higlwr standard of livihii backed by si ronger
unions and new welfare slale pr6grams made it possible for la-
bor to challenge the power of business and government through
most of [le postwar years. Tlhe struggle for control never ended,
but in the mid-1970s, the cost of fringe benefits, the expansion of
social programs, and labor's empowerment weakened buin ess'
control over labor and contributed to tile demise of I1w accord.
The labor accord analysis developed by Bowles (1982),
Bowles and Gintis (1982), Bowles, Gordon, Weisskopf (1983,
1986), Piven and Cloward (1982) anmong others does not directly
deal with issues of race and gender. lint the historical records
show that by the late 1960s, business and tile state had nego-
tiated similar pacts with persons of color and woniei. A key
goal of Reaganomics was to undo all three accords in order to
contract tie welfare stale and disempower popular movements.
The Racial Accord
The postwar period also witnessed reorganizatioi of race
relations as tile "go slow" politics of the early civil rights move-
ment gave way to mort, militant demands for integration and
civil rights in the mid-1950s. Until then Jim Crow remained
strong and the dominant wing of the civil rights moveilveiii ac-
cepted limited change throuiglh self-help, litigation, and lobbying
and tokenism. African Americans lacked the resources needed
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to win the fight for racial integration despil, a tenfold increase
in the membership of [ie NAACP and tlhu formation of the
Congress of Racial Equalily. But with the I.5 Montgornery flus
Boycott the civil righlis movement became more mifiilanl. Tired
of gradualism and tokenism the civil rights movement turned
to direct action such as sit-ins, pray-ins, wade-ins, boycotts mid
Freedom Rides to secure its ends. The NAACP's numerous court
victories against segregation, but especialiy the 1954 Supreme
Court decision banning separate but equal schools empowered
the movement.
The growing size and militancy of the civil rights move-
ment eventually forced state action to maintain civil order and
restore black confidence in the government. When, iri 1956, an-
gry black voters left the Democratic Party to protest its lack
of support for civil rights, politicians took note. In 1957, Eisen-
hower reluctantly sent Federal troops into Uittle Rock, Arkansas
to enforce the 1954 Supreme Court decision. That same year
both Democrats and Republicans backed legislation which pro-
tected the right of blacks to vote ahd created the Commission
on Civil Rights (Piven & Cloward, 1971). At the same time,
the blatant and often violent refusal of Southern white officials
to obey federal civil rights laws engendered sympathy for the
cause among working-class blacks an( nortlher whites. ]linally,
[ie civil righlis movenent escalated its demarinds l illvil ['frollm'
constitutional prolections to equitable distribution of societal
power.
The race accord, negotiated by Kennedy who owed his nar-
row 1960 presidential victory to the swing black vole (Meier &
Rudlwick, '1976) reduced racial barriers to voting eniphlyment,
education, and housing and expanded social welfare programs.
The shift in the Democratic Party's civil rights stance was sig-
naled when Kennedy appointed blacks to high federal posi-
tions, forced Governor Wallace to desegregate the University
of Alabamria, recommended a sweeping civil rights law, sup-
ported the march on Washiiigton led by )r. Martin ,uther King,
and privately encouraged nearly 100 corporale and loundation
leaders to contribute over one million dollars to the five major
civil rights groups (Meier & Rudwick, 1976; Silkoff, 198 1). After
Kennedy's assassination Johnson offered to seat the Mississiplli
Arcords
Freedonm Democratic Party al the 1964 Democratic Convention.
Congress followed suit and passed the 19()4 Civil Rights Act and
it passed the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Ihe movement's demands
for greater economic justice were met with The Great Society
and the War on Iloverly which further enlarged the welfare
state. Sargent Shriver, who directed the War on Poverty, said
it created "a new relationship and new grievance procedui'
between the pour an the. rest of society just as the National
Labor Relation Act did for unions" (liven & Cloward, 1971,
pp. 270-271).
Negotiated by business and .government to contain the civil
rights movement without modifying white supremacy, the ra-
cial accord eased tensions for a while. Business and govern-
ment secured increased political loyalty from the rising nim-
ber of African American voters who from 1960-1964 firnislwdl
Democrats with the presidenicy and control over both houses of
Congress (Sitkoff, 1981). Race relations were stabilized without
any loss of while privilege or control of the political process.
In exchange for their cooperation, African Americans and other
persons of color won basic rights and greater access to the polit-
ical and economic systems, But the race accord also empowered
the civil rights movement and modified the balance of power,
making it easier for persons or color to challenge and at times
threaten the dominance of the while power structure. In the
late 1960ls, these challenges included the "long-hot summers,
the spread of the civil rights movement from the South to the
North, and the replacement of the integrationist call for "ilack
and White Togetlher" by the more radical demand for "Black
Power" (SitkLoff, 1981). li the '970s, middle-class African Ame-
icans won local and state office and in 1984 Jesse Jackson was
a candidate for President of the United States.
1e Ge:nder Accord
The post-war period also witnessec a reorganization of gen-
der politics due to changes in women's role that posed threats
to patriarchal authori'ty and fueled the rebirth of the feminisl
movement. Under the accord, the state reduced gender barriers
to employment, education, credit and pensions, expanded social
welfare benefits and reproductive rights, and granted women
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greater access to the state. In exchange for these advances, the
women s movement promised less militancy, conliinued politi-
cal allegiance, and demands that would not challenge the utn-
derpinnings of patriarchal arrangements.
The women's movement had been in the doldruns during
the 1940s and 1950s, but it did not disappear. A small network of
middle class women sustained mutually antagonistic voices in
behalf of women's rights wili one wing supporting legislative
reforms for poor and working wonen and 1ie )lher pressing
for the Equal Rights Amendment (Evans, 1989; Rupp & Thy-
lor, 1987). African American womtn kept segregation, lynching,
and race discrimination on the political agenda; and working-
class women of both races struggled to preserve Iheir wartime
employment gains (Evans, 1989; Gabin, 1990; Rtpp & Thylor,
1987). Meanwhile, changes in tlW sLructure of work and family
life exposed thousands of women to discriminalitm, led them
to ask why the equal-opportiunity-for-all promise did not apply
to them, renewed interest in the Equal Rights Amendnient, and
eventually revived the feminist nimovement.
Kennedy initiated the gender accords in 1961 to fulfill prom-
ises to the womien who. voted for him, to side-Itrack renewed in-
terest in the ERA and to keep increasingly independent women
voters tied to the Democratic party. Pressed by Esther Peterson,
his appointed head of the Women's Bureau, Ktennedy estab-
lished the Commission on the Siatus of W'Vonwn in 1961 (Evans,
1989, McGlen, 1983; Rupp & Taylor, 1981). Its 1963 report, Amer-
ican Wonen paid careful obeisance to the centrality of women's
traditional roles, but documented the realities of female inequal-
ity. Although the report opposed the Equal Rights Amendment,
it exposed many problems of em ployment discrimination, un-
equal pay, the lack of social services, continued legal inequality
and other gender inequities.
Although stlpportive of women's traditional role, the Com-
mission's Reporl activated many wornen. It generaled commis-
sions on tilt status of women in most stLates and led to the
passage of the 1963 Equal Pay Act which otllawed gender-
based wage discrimination (Evans 1989). But patriarchal resis-
tance persisted. Congress refused to provide equal pay based
on comparable worth, the broader pay equity concept favored
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by the women's novemrent. A legislalor added the word "sex"
to Tille VII of the 196,I Civil Rights Act in hopes of defeating the
bill which prohibited employment dist-rimination (Evans 1989;
Rupp & Taylor, 1987).
Just as the state's rehictance to enforce the 1954 Brown de-
cision catalyzed the civil rights movement in the late 1950s,
the refusal by Equal Employment Opportunity Comniission to
act on thousands of sex discrimination complaints mobilized
the feminist movement. 'lired of gr'adualism and tokenism and
angered by the widening male-female wage gap (Bird, 1968),
middle-class women formed new feminist organizations ii the
1960s including the National Organization of Women (NOW)
(1967), the Women's Equity Action League (WEAL) (1970), and
the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) (1971). The in-
surgency crossed 'ace, class, and age lines with the aplear'anlce
of the National Welfar-e Rights Organization (NWRO) (1966),
National Black Feminist Organization (N31FO) (1973), and, the
Coalition of Labor Union Women (('I.UII) (197,1). Younger
women activists in the Student Non-Violent Organizing Coi-
mittee (SNCC) and Student For a Dernocratic Society (SDS)
angered by male domination of their organizations and personal
lives began to call for women's liberation, not just women's
rights (Chafe, 1978, Evans i980, 1989).
The new militancy expanded the genlder accord in Ihi eairly
1970s. President Johnson issued ExecutivE. Order 11375 in 1967
which mandated affirmative action to redress discrimination by
firms wilh federal conlracts. In 1972, Congress passed Ihe ERA
although right-wing opposition in a few key states pIevenited
its ratification. This was followed by Title IX of the .1972 Fduca-
tion Act Amendments, the 1974 Equal Credit Act, and li. '1978
Pregnancy Disability Act. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
women in a host of class action sex discrimination stilts and in
1973, it legalized the right to abortion. Women also secured ac-
cess to party councils, political appointlments, and elected office-
Negotiated to contain the women's liberation movement
without modifying patriarchal arrangements, the gender accord
expanded women's rights, welfare statlt benefits, awd econmic
opportunities. Gr'ealer economic independence, reproductive
control, and access to the state modified the gender balance
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of power and made it easier for \vornerl (Ii challel, tile patri-
archa powers of business and the state.
Taken together in [lie short run, lie postwar accords en-
hanced economic profitability, political legitimacy, ind stabi-
lized class, race and gender relations wilhout coslin, business
and the stale, undue loss of coin rol. In fact, they contained pop-
ila r movements. By confinnin. the contest to democralic rights
and distributional gains, they directed 11 struggies away from
theC structural roots of inequalit'y. But in 1iew long iun, the ac-
cords had paradoxical effects I thai evenit uily caulsed busii-tss
and government to retreat from lhern. They increased [lie polit-
ical influence of popular movements who e protests spread to
new issues and new .roups. The demands of the empowered
lovements turned (lie welfare state as well as th workplace
into highly contested lerrains. The harIl-won victories of irade,
unions, civil rights and womein's groups, amlong others, Chil-
lenged the once impervious structures of cl,iss, race, and gentthir
dominance in the family, the market, and slate (Bowles, & in-
tis, 1982; lowles, Gordon, & Weisskopf, 1983, 1986; Piven &
Cloward, 1982).
In brief, the accords leveled the playing field too much for
business and the state. Like [he nation's founding fathers wiho
worried that with "too much democracy" the landless major-
ity might (ovtrrule the landed minority (Farrand, 1972), today's
leaders explored ways to roll back increasingly effective clhal-
lenges to lthe power structure (('rozier, I luntinglon, & Wata-
nulsi, 1975; Dickson & Noble, 1981; Wolfe, 1980). The accords
110 longer achieved their ends and had hi be undone.
Breaking the Accords: 'rhe Reagan Legacy
Tlhroughout most of the pistwar period it seemed that the
modern welfare state, fueled by Keynesian economics and the
three accords, would expand forrever. But hindsight reeals thal
business and government's support for the welfare state was
t ne of a series of time-bound solutions 0 ole ) roblems of Cop-
ilAl accumulilaon and social conflict of il partictilar historical
period. ly [lie mid-I971)s, these post-wanr solution; had begun
to unravel due to th-e loss of United Slals world helemony,
increased inlernalional economic coril ' il ion, rising nalional
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indebtedness, declining corporate profitability, chronic eco-
nomic stagnalion and activte resistance from !rganiizeCt populii Ia r
movements. Trhe erosion of the nation's economic and politi-
cal power reached crisis proportions in the 19V70s and reqtuired
plans to restriachure the political economy. While its prior re-
structLuring Cluring the Great Depression had expanded the wel-
fare state and strengthened the trade union, civil risghts, and
women's movewents, Ithe new political srtegy emphasized
austeritv and sought to roll back lhe igaiins off the previous pc.
riod. Its goals included redistributing income ipwards, cheap-
ening lie cost Of labor, and cu rbing the infltlience o1 p0u Ular
movements (Pivet & Cloward 1982; Weisskopf, 1981). Accom-
plishing this goal included shattering the postwar consensus on
government's expanded role, in the economy, and undoing the
labor, race, and gender accords.
Shattiring the Po,.;Iwar Consensus Oil ,A c' ( iN*erim'll.
The Reagani revohltion began Iw attacking big government.
The prevailing economic orthodoxy now held that couliniries
with low labor and welfare state costs fared best in domes-
tic and international trade. Reflecting this, a special l97-1 is-
sue of Busim'ss Week on the capitalist crisis, called for Ir,; gov-
ernnent spending to promote priva te investment. The reporter
acknowledged that idea of doing with less so that big busi-
ness could haw, more would be a hard pill for Americans to
swallow. The allack on big government meanl Keynesian eco-
nolics had to go. "Supply-side eco.1ornics," its replact';nenl,
blamed the nation's econonlic ills on "big goviernnent" and
called for lower taxes, reduced governmenl spending (military
exempted), fewer government regulations, and more private
sector initiatives. Supply-side economics undercut the welfare
stale by intentionally creating the largest deficit in the nation',
history. David Stockman, Reagan's first budgcvt direc or, later
coniftessed that the Adlinistralion hipped that the deficit would
justify domestic progran cuts for ,'ears to comie (Bloek, 1987).
These policies combined with economic d iwi 1 [urns and dCini-
dustrialization redistribilh'tl inconte Ulwards, loweredl the slan-
dard (f living, and put opular antovenents Oi the deftnsivc
(Phillips, 1991; (reenslein & lBarancik, 199(1). Withoul totallv
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eliminating Keynesian demand-side policie., supply ,ide eco-
Ilonlics Weakened th inatelial ard the ideolgical support for
government intervention in the economily, especially in the so-
cial welfare arena.
The attack on big governmert and thei retreal from the
accords went hand in hand. 1loth were part of Ilie effort by
business and [he state to transftr' the costs (of prodiction anti
r,production back Lo l poor and work nll; class, and to re-
-ain control over the family, the market, and the slate. To re-
distribute income upwards and to curb lhe irllueut'u, of popular
iovements, it was necessary to 4ltnch all assault on [lie wel-
fare state and on lhe groups whose demands cont'ibuted to
its growth. The lower standard of livin, that followtd is con-
firmed in regular media accounts of thie feminization ol poverly,
the loss of civil rights gains, the rise of Ohw working ior, and
lhe declinirg middle class.
indoing lie labor Accord
During the postwar years, econonic prosperity, relatively
low unemployrment, and the laboi-management accord brought
a degree of harmony to the workplace and [lie state, especially
in the highly unionized industries. By the mid-197is, facing a
profitability panic, business turnud against[ the unlions and Hie
we.tll re state whose victories ii vw interfer'l with its abilitv to
lower labor costs anti control lab w-rnanagem[ent relations. Tilt'
post-war labor accord which had increased the power of lhe
unions and expanded the welfare state had to go.
By all accounts, Reigan signaled thi' end of [li p'ost-war
labor management pad in 1981 wien he fired over 1I ,(]00) slrik-
ing air traffic controllers. This action, combined wi lh antilabor
appointments to the National Labor Relalions Board. imnplic-
itly granted employers permission to reviv long-shinned an-
tiunion practices: decertifing 1in1ons, O.t1-soLtircing productii,
and hiring permanent replacenients for striking workers (Kil-
born, 199(1; t'rokesch, 185). To strip unions of their excessive
power, busilless fought labor taw reforms and encorraged li e
formation of new antiinion groups such as tie Council for a
Union Free .lnvironment (Boye 1986).
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Combined with plan closures, bankrull'cies
, and Ihe de-
cline of jobs in ianufacturing, the atitck on lbor weakelnd the
labor movemen. Union membership fell to 15" of lhe labor
force, down from its 1955 peak of 35%. Unablk to fight back,
workers and unions accptted smaller wage increases, less fa-
voraile work rides, and a host of other take h.acks just IU SILVe
their jobs. But according to most experts, the promised exchange
of job security never malteiialized (P'rokesch, I 985).
Shrinking social welfare progra ni 1ot o l transferred the
cost of family maintenanct back to workers and the pto', but
helped management regain control over labor. It restored the
disciplinary power of unemp1.loym1ent which managemnl had
historically counted on to keep wages down, hit1i which e1and-
ing cash assislance programs had uindercuL. Despite their inea-
gerness, programrs such as Aid. to l)ependent Children (AFDC)
and Unemployment Insurance (UI) crealed an economic cush-
ion for workers. The cushion helps employed workers risk join-
ing unions or ot lierwise fighting for better paying jobs. Inflation.
and the Reagan cuts reducud purclh. iig power and the ritltuber
of people who qualified for both UI and AF)C. The Adniin-
istration's refusal to raise [he minimum wage 'rl-n ILJo 1-1990
pressed wages doVwnr as did tht 1988 Family Support Act
which channeled many poor womenll into low-paid jol', ill tit
rapidly expanding servite sector where labor shortages Ihrcat-
ened It force wages ill-.
Retrea! From The Race Accord
The civil rights revolution bror ighl a degree of harunrmv to
race relations. it strengtlhened the )emocralic pary, secured
black allegiance to the stale, and began to redress historic racial
grievances. However, Ihe registration Of more black voters, the
dramatic increase in the number of black elected official!;, and
the imlplernenlalion of affirmalive action programs that com-
pensated blacks for past inequalities also challenged white so-
premacy. Support for the race accord vas shnl-lived and came
to an abrupt end. Uncomfortable with expinded civil rights,
many white Americans began to regard them as reverse dis-
crimination. For business and the slate, the empowered civil
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rights move:ment had become too strong, too demanding, and
too expensive.
Once viewed a central to electoral victories, both Il)eiocrats
and Republicans began to ignore black voters, I .espite I lie dov-
astating riots that fullowed the assassinItion of Martill lut[her
King Jr., the issue of racial equality dropjped from the politi-
cal agenda of boh major political parties (Orfield, 1 988). The
1968 presidential campaign was the last to seriosly debate the
problems of the Urban ghetto. Ani ideological campaign helped
to justify the shift. From Moynihan's I%,5 repoirt that blamed
poverty on the black family, to Nixon's Souther'n Strategy" 1t
Willie 1-orton's appearance in Mish's 1988 cam paigr ads, the
GOP wooed disaffected white Democrats lby main ipula oting racial
tensions. The Republicans carried the white vote in every elec-
tion between 1968 and 1984 (Sitkoff, 1981). Smarting fron their
losses, the l)emocratic Party backed away from tHe race accord.
To keep white volers, blacks were asked to lay low and to desist
from pIushing their agenda too hard. In contrast to the l'arty's
historic pattern of rewardiui, loyal intere;l groups, when blacks
did not obey, party leaders tarred thetir with the special in-
terest label implying that they were selfish and motivated by
self-interest (Wellman, 1968; Edsall and l-dsall, 1991),
With the cooperation of many D(Jernocrats, the Reagan
AdminisLration dismantled the civil rights pro1grans that com-
prised the racial accord. It equated affirmative action with cluo-
[as and reverse discrimination, decimated the budgels of civil
rights enforcement agencies, and appointed civil rights oppo-
nents to the Civil Righls Commission and the Supreme Court
(Chambers, 1987). In 1990, Bush veLoed the C'ivil Rights Act
which tried to redress sone of these wrongs. In 1991, lie nomi-
nated Clarence Thomas, a conserv tive African Anerican
opposed Lo affirmative action, to replace the retiring liberal Su-
preme Coulrt jurist Thurgood Marshall. The Administration's
domestic cuLbacks also weakened the position of people of color.
thev focusecd heavily on rneans-tested programrts. sich as
AH)C, Mclicaid, and subsidizing, hotsitig---which serve dis-
proportionate numbers of imnpoverished people of color while
tre ading more lightly on Medicare and Social Security which
serve more middle-class whites (Slessarev, 1988).
Accords
The hard-won gins male by persons of color faded dli rng
the eighties. The number of poor families of color rose sha1irply
while in all classes, persons of color lost ground. Their stan-
dard of livin,, life expectancy, and hekalth status declined while
infant mortality aid diseases rates climbed. Fewer lrer' , s of
color received student loans, graduated from high school or al-
tended college. Morigage hlais become less available, and Ilihir
neighborhoods became more segregated, My retreating fromr lhe
racial accord, the nalion's leaders put the civil rights noveneni
on the defensive. They divided the nation on racial gLrounds,
and implicitly provoked the rise of hate violence,
Undoiny Tl' C 'iider Accord
The gender accord stabilized gender relations by bringing
the law into line with the changing realities of women's live",
correcting [ong-slniding ge-nder inequities, aind granmting
women a place in electoral politics. Buit it also expalIdCd tl
welfare state, empouered Ilit' wolen's movemint, and mnder-
cut palriarchal arrangements. like the racial and labor accords,the gender accord came to in abrulpt end. The result la" been
cheaper labor, a redistribution Of income iI pwa rds, anId the
strenjt,hening of palriarchal siruthtres.
The 198 Platform of the Rlepublican 'arty sii11 led ilit' end
of the post-war gender accord. It dropped the party's former en-
dorsenent of the l-kpaal Rights Anendnit'nl, called for a consti-
tutional amendment Io end abortion, affirmed the Party's belief
"in the traditional role and value of the family in our society,"
and emphasized tht imiportance of rnothehood and honemak-
ing in maintaining the nations value (McGlen & O'Connor, 1983,
p. 74). If fully implemented, the Family Protection Act of '1981
would have made societal institutions more patriarchal. i pro-
posed to end federal support for child care, abortion, family
planning, women's shelters, rape crisis centers and welfart, pro-
grams believed to undermine lhe traditional nuclear family. II
prohibited legal aid lawyers from handling aborlion, divorce,
lesbian or gay rights cases, banned sex education in ,chools,
coeducational sports, and [ie use of federal funds for s;clhool
materials depicting homosexualily aid non- raditional gender
roles (77e Magazine, 1981).
Journal (f S-iology & 5'; iial Welfare
Seeking to transfer I1he costs of amiily maintenancvback to
the family, the Reagan administration encouraged working and
middle-class women to return home. The attack on big govern-
men[ eliminated thousands of public sector jobs that employed
women and persons of color (Erie, Rein, & Wiget, 1983). Re-
duced child care, housing, health care, food benefits and social
services increased women's household burdens wvicl made it
harder for them to be enployed. l.ack of services also added to
the costs of family mainlnance pre.Iviously subsidized by the
state. Undoing the gender accord also weakened allirmaLive ac-
tion and anti-discrimination laws. It iginored sex and race segre-
gation of (lie workplace and refused to support family policies
to ease women's work and family burdens, In sharp contrast to
efforts to send middle-class women back home, ihe 1988 Family
Support Act replaced AFIC's voluntlry work incentives with
rules which forced poor women to work outside Iheir homes.
Those not deprived of support, saw (i, value of Iheir benefits
fall by a Ihird. AFDC, which allows women to raise children
without men, came in for especially harsh treatment because it
openly threatened patriarchal norms.
The attack on aburtion rights and Iamily plannicg services
and the rise of involuntary sterilizations undermined women's
control over their bodies, while less support for wonmtn's shel-
ters, programs for batlered wives, and rape crises centers
implicitly endorsed male violence ag'aiist women. .Vitlh the in-
troduction of Learnfare which docks about a $1001 a month from
the checks of welfare mothers whose children miss school with-
out an acceptable excuse (Cerharz 1990), welfare programs be-
coie more coercive. Similar coercive tendencies characterize
awedfare' which gives women a bonus for marrying and leav-
ing the rolls (Kerr 1991), and plans that offer financial incentives
to wotnen for using Norplant, the new ldng-term contracep-
tive implant.
These and other measures strC( deeply at the inustitutions
which siipport the economic securitv and indlpendeince o f
women. The cuts also reversed gains that women along with
persons of color and organized labor have won siic 1he 1930's.
The attack on the qual Rights Amentndment and abortion 1)1u
the woiien's mowent onl the .lt't'iisive amid limited its ability
to seek new gains.
Condlo,'on
The historical forces thati underpin the extl,iusi on and r ii -
traction of tile wlfare stale, st thati li, Reagan legacy
goes beyond th' michi.nations of in actor t rnu' lI presiden I to
the roots of our economic and political system, i r d that tile rise
and fall of the welfare state has more to do with maintainin. ; or-
porate profitability, political legitimacy, racial hirarchies, aid
patriarchal arraillitients than [lit satisfaction of human neds.
Reaganoiics was not fully iimplemented Ii(r Iotally succes:v.
ful. Ti.i1 t did eng,,ineer a dramatic reversal of Iublic policy and
ignored the high human cost that accompanied the change. Al-
tempting to secti re economic anid political control, tile presicntl
undermined the philosophy and structure of the liberal welfart'
state, weakened pol-uiar movenienls, and eroted deniocratic
struictures. Tile iew austerity proglli has fostered distrust and
violen et, as economic deprivation and inflaninaltory politics pil
one group against inother. l, i' ro, of busiles and the stille.
iil creating the Reagan legacy is ttiscuired to Uhu ixtetl that ob-
servers blame the rear, chaos, pet'rty, social dtLcay, and loss
of communal solidlarilt that Io! platlSues (liir iliolitl, oil Ii'
behavior of thos, 1i1 the bottom instead tile deisions made Ib)y
those at the top.
No social syst'rn cai fundiol for long wit ho- 't a vialath'
labor force, families ible to mairtain themselves, aid a mini-
mally content and [oval citizenry. No social s'steni can thrive,
no m mtter how nirch military ni hlt and patriotism it musIer'S,
if its people remain divided, and disaffected. Recognizing lii.
fact, leading bLusinI,'ss groups have begun to call for health ca't
and educational reforrms (The Committee on l-:onomic ltvl-
opment, 1987) and policies to reduce the rising rales of crini,
hunger, honelessnitss, illiteracy, illegal drug use, high ifila ut
mortality, and other by-pModtucts of Reaganomiit's (New York
Tini's, I t88a, 19881)). IEven som, taxpayers have accepted Ilt'
neeid for more' revenues. Finilly, coalitons of social activists
have continued I resist the attack on the welfare state. These
move'ents have the potential to mndo tihe disastrous Reagan
Iuinrril of Sociologl), & Social WVEllare
legacy. EventuinlV, their victories will confirm I lit progressive
social change cannot arise without people's activism and "pres-
sures from below."
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